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Mobility  systems  raise  multiple  questions  of justice.  Work  on  mobility  justice  and  policy  often  treats
different  elements  of  the  debate  separately,  for example  focussing  on environmental  justice  or  accessi-
bility.  This  is problematic  as it can  privilege  policy  solutions  without  a full view  of the  winners  and  losers
and  the  values  implicit  in  that.  Using  analysis  of  current  policy,  we  investigate  how  mobility  justice can
reconcile  its different  components,  and  ﬁnd  two  major  consequences.  First,  is doubt  about  the  justice of
the  existing  policy  approach  which  tries  to tackle  transport  pollution  primarily  through  a  shift  to low
emission  vehicles.  This  approach  privileges  those  with  access  to  private  vehicles  and  further  privileges
certain  sets  of  activities.  Second  is a need  to reassess  which  basic  normative  ideas  should  be appliednclusion
ollution
in  mobility  justice.  Work  on  mobility  justice  has  tended  to appeal  to conceptions  of justice  concerned
with  access  to  resources  including  resources  enabling  mobility.  These  conceptions  say  little  about  how
resources  should  be used.  We  show  that  avoiding  stark  inequalities  means  collectively  thinking  about
how  resources  are  used,  about  how  we  value  activities  involving  mobility,  and  about  what  sorts  of goods
and  services  we  create.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under the  CC  BY license. Introduction
Whether or not they are explicitly recognised as such, normative
deas are embodied in policies, policy tools and actions inﬂuencing
ransport. Tied up with their explanations of how transport does or
ould work, are assertions about what is valuable (for instance time,
ost, safety) and assertions about how value should be achieved or
ought, and sometimes about what constitutes reasonable expec-
ations (for instance, polluter pays, fare subsidy, operator proﬁt).
ncreasingly there is recognition of the justice concerns associated
ith mobility and transport. This includes justice questions raised
y difﬁculties some people face in moving around, whether that is
oving around neighbourhoods, or over long distances. Further, it
nvolves justice concerns associated with impacts of Transport, and
he often uneven distribution of those impacts. There is now work
n multiple aspects of what we might call mobility justice, includ-
ng on matters such as accessibility (e.g. Refs. [46,47,53,59,69]),
ffordability [54], safety (e.g. Refs. [72,101,102]), greenhouse gas
missions [51,75], health impacts of pollution [55], and land take
or infrastructure (e.g. Ref. [22]).
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: c.a.mullen@leeds.ac.uk (C. Mullen),
.R.Marsden@its.leeds.ac.uk (G. Marsden).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.03.026
214-6296/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article u(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Often, and with some reason given their complexity, work has
focused on one or other of these aspects. We argue that this
tendency to focus separately on different aspects of justice has
limitations which can be far greater than a matter of scope, and
that addressing this has two  major implications for mobility justice.
First, considering aspects of justice independently can lead to a fail-
ure to consider how solutions to one problem might impact other
justice concerns. Second, reconciling multiple aspects of mobility
justice prompts a reassessment of theories of justice or fairness
implicit in many of these normative debates. In particular, there
is a very strong normative tradition of placing value on individual
choice. This tradition has unpinned ideas of justice within transport
policy. This paper critically engages with this approach, showing
how this framing of value can undermine basic ideas of mobility
justice because it tends to arbitrarily privilege some choices, and
preferences of some groups of people. Given this, we  contend that
sustaining basic ideas of mobility justice requires direct consider-
ation of substantive questions of value.
The mobility we  consider in this paper is primarily that con-
cerning movement of people and sometimes goods, but without
reference to questions such as citizenship. In this use, ‘mobility’ is
broader than ‘transport’ is often taken to be. Mobility in this con-
text includes the norms, expectations, laws, communications and
competences which inﬂuence the transport system (see Ref. [8]).
It also includes movement other than ‘trips’, such as walking to a
neighbour. Nevertheless, the term mobility also covers a range of
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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atters which extend beyond those we discuss in this paper, such
s migration.
In the next section we outline theoretical notions under-
inning mobility justice, including ideas of how people’s lives
atter, and why therefore mobility and other social and economic
rrangements affecting people’s lives should also matter. Then, we
nvestigate different aspects of mobility justice and the potential
ensions and resolutions for addressing these aspects through a
ase study around the transition to low emission vehicles. By draw-
ng in a more holistic set of concerns we explore how this approach
o tackling pollution issues can create social exclusion and disad-
antage both for those without access to vehicles and for those who
truggle ﬁnancially to run a vehicle. In the face of this, we begin to
xplore how different approaches to reducing pollution, involving
obility systems less reliant on private powered vehicles may be
ore promising at reconciling different aspects of mobility justice
cf. [46]). It is in examining the potential of these approaches for
ettling tensions in mobility justice, that we engage with choice
ased theories of justice, and then examine the case for collec-
ive thinking about values and what sorts of activities should be
ccommodated, enabled and curtailed. Whilst such an approach is
otentially politically contentious it is clear that embedded within
he status quo are a range of implicit assumptions which if codiﬁed
xplicitly would also be contentious. This approach is new territory
n discourses on mobility justice, but has roots both in transport
tudies (e.g. Refs. [2,67]), and in approaches in political philoso-
hy which ask “what sort of society” we should have [12,49,78].
he paper concludes by brieﬂy discussing approaches to decision-
aking for a more just mobility system, taking account of both the
mpacts of Transport, and of the ways in which different activities
re supported or constrained by provision for mobility.
. Mobility, transportation and conceptions of justice
It is rarely, if ever, possible to simply read off from a descrip-
ion of a situation to an account of what should be done. There can
e little dispute that a situation is bad (for instance, deaths on the
oads), but much greater disagreement about justiﬁability of mea-
ures to reduce deaths—consider arguments about reducing speed
imits, about strict liability [32], and so on. Some investigations
f mobility justice draw on speciﬁc, and different, theories of jus-
ice (e.g. Refs. [53]). Others do not apply any particular theory, but
nstead implicitly appeal to general notions of fairness or equality
55,36]. Given this diversity of approach it would be meaningless to
escribe one theory which underpins work on mobility justice. We
an, however, outline some basic notions which will be compatible
ith many of the arguments on mobility justice, and which while
nder-determined, distinguish these arguments from other norma-
ive approaches such as libertarian approaches (e.g. Ref. [60]). These
otions will help ground the debate in the rest of this paper, giv-
ng some basis for addressing questions such as ‘equality of what?’
e.g. Refs. [9,14,80]), or what collective responsibility do we have
or one another? These basic notions are:
i Beginning from the assumption that each person matters
(morally) as much as any other: so their life matters, and their
ability to make something of their life also matters [35,38,39].
ii There is a societal responsibility to make political, social and
economic arrangements which reﬂect this assumption that each
person matters. This has been described as showing equal con-
cern [25,35,38,39]. The societal obligation also falls on each
person, so that people have some responsibility to accept limi-
tations for the beneﬁt of others [59]. Social Science 18 (2016) 109–117
iii Treating people ‘as equals’ is not necessarily the same as ‘equal
treatment,’ as treatment as equals may  require taking account
of people’s differing needs and contexts ([24], p. 68).
These ideas are compatible with theories falling, broadly, within
major and frequently contrasted branches of political and moral
philosophy, including liberal egalitarianism on one hand, and virtue
ethics and communitarianism on the other. The former is based in
a tradition which has been, and to a large extent remains, domi-
nant in western philosophy over the last two centuries (see Refs.
[48,25]) however the latter which has a far longer history, has been
regaining prominence in recent decades (e.g. Refs. [1,48,99]). Very
broadly, for liberal egalitarians, justice must have concern for the
distribution of ability or power a person has to exercise choice
about the way in which they live (see Refs. [25,56,77]). This requires
concern for distribution of resources and conditions, so:
“government must assure all citizens a decent level of income,
housing, education, and health care, on the grounds that those
who are crushed by economic necessity are not truly free to
exercise choice in other domains” ([77], p. 58)
Some of the motivation for this focus on choice (within and
beyond egalitarian theories) stems from distrust of the idea that
society should constrain individualism. This position is found
within some political opposition to authoritarian government (e.g.
Ref. [4]), and also within some struggles against discrimination
where choice and individualism are adopted as a response to social
repression, such as social expectations that women remain in their
place—in the home and out of public life (see e.g. [100]). As such,
there is an obvious appeal to liberal theories of justice.
In this context, the more recent advocates of communitarian
and virtue ethics theories, have tended to frame their arguments
as responding to apparent deﬁciencies in the ‘choice’ based liberal
theories. It may  be helpful to outline two  strands to these argu-
ments. First, critics of ‘liberal choice’ point out that the conception
of choice in those liberal theories is one which assumes that people
can make a decision as if in a vacuum, unencumbered by context,
such as social norms, partial and value laden perceptions of the
world, and even psychological inﬂuences (see e.g. Ref. [48]). This,
they argue is an implausible idea of the way in which people act,
and think about acting. People exist, and form their sense of self, in
relation to the world (and society) in which they live (see e.g. Ref.
[99]). Further, our understanding of the world is partial and dis-
tributed in the sense that no one person is omniscient, and is value
laden in relying on contestable and changing theories (scientiﬁc,
social and so on) to make sense of the world [6,88]. The context in
which people make their choices, is one which is situated, with mul-
tiple inﬂuences, and this frames both actions and decisions about
actions (or choice). Second, the ‘choice’ based theories of justice
tend, it is argued, to present ‘choices’ or options to people which
appear unfair. This sort of argument is commonly made in relation
to those liberal theories which justify large economic inequalities,
for instance, theories which assert that redistribution is unjust on
the grounds that it interferes with people’s choices about the way in
which they use their property (e.g. [60]). However the objection can
also be levelled at liberal egalitarian theories despite the concern
that those theories have for making social and economic arrange-
ments in which everyone has access to (some level of) resource. One
difﬁculty is that their focus on individual choice, does not allow for
adequate (or fair) accommodation of social values. For instance,
choice based theories are criticised by feminist virtue ethicists on
the basis of the way in which they treat care giving. While recog-
nising that ‘choice’ based egalitarian theories would require that
resources are provided for care (since some people need care to be
able to exercise choice), they argue that this commodiﬁcation does
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ot capture the nature or social value of care giving (see for instance,
ef. [81]). For virtue ethicists and communitarians, there is a case
or theories of justice asking what should be valued, accommodated
nd supported by society.
This brief discussion indicates that there are at least some com-
elling reasons underpinning both of these branches of political
hilosophy. In this paper, while we begin from a position of accept-
ng concern for equality we are also, at this stage, neutral between
hese two branches. As our argument develops we  show that for
obility and Transport, the liberal ‘choice based’ theories face par-
icular problems, and this makes a case for adopting an approach
loser to the virtue ethics and communitarian approach.
Both of these branches of political philosophy will have con-
ern that people have material and other conditions needed to
ive well. In relation to mobility this broadly involves considera-
ion of accessibility and inclusion on one hand and life-threatening
isks and aspects of sustaining life on the other (e.g. Refs.
3,36,46,53,55,57,59,95,102]). Both are conditions for surviving and
iving well, and making something of life. The focus on inclusion,
ccessibility, or availability of movement or Transport, recognises
hat this enables engagement in social, economic political and per-
onal activities. The focus on sustaining life and on physical risk or
arm reﬂects the role of transport in provision of essential goods
nd services, and in ending lives in multiple ways, particularly
hrough collisions, poor air quality and potentially through carbon
missions. In this paper we do not challenge the relevance of these
actors, but we do emphasise signiﬁcance to justice of considering
hese aspects together rather than as distinct elements.
. Pollution reduction and the reductionism of mobility
ustice: a case of British policy on tackling transport
ollution
To explore the ﬁrst of our contentions from Section 1 we use a
tudy of the policy approach in adopted in Britain aimed at reducing
arbon and other transport pollution. Whilst a broad spectrum of
olicies could be applied to tackle local and international pollution
roblems, the overwhelming response has been to pursue techno-
ogical solutions to reduce tailpipe emissions and therefore tackle
nvironmental injustice. We  draw on the broader conceptualisa-
ion of mobility justice which emerges from Section 2 to exemplify
he risks in considering different aspects of mobility justice in iso-
ation.
The reliance that our existing mobility patterns have on fos-
il fuels creates a heavy, and well recognised, burden of pollution.
n many countries transport is the major source of poor air qual-
ty including nitrogen oxides and particulates which have huge
mpacts on morbidity and mortality [11]; WHO, 2012. For instance,
n the UK, poor air quality predominantly caused by Transport, has
een estimated to have mortality impacts ‘equivalent to nearly
9,000 deaths’ in 2008 ([11], pp. 1–2).1 Pollution from diesel has
een identiﬁed as a cause of lung cancer [96]. Moreover, exposure to
oor air quality is uneven, and there is a broad correlation between
evels of nitrogen oxide pollution and the proportion of households
n poverty [55]. Beyond this, emissions from transport account for
early a quarter of total worldwide carbon emissions from fuel
ombustion [42]. This pollution prompts concerns not only about
he nature of impacts, but also about the ways in which climate
mpacts on health and welfare and can be exacerbated by existing
ocial and income inequalities ([43], p. 6). The nature, scale, and the
1 The complicated language here is because poor air quality will be one among
everal factors implicated in deaths, making it unfeasible to attribute given deaths
o  poor air quality alone. The mortality ﬁgures which are given are therefore an
stimate of life years lost across a population due to poor air quality (see Ref. [11]. Social Science 18 (2016) 109–117 111
distribution of impacts of pollution on health and welfare, make a
compelling moral case for seeking substantial emission reductions.
In many countries, including Britain, the policy approach on
tackling transport pollution relies heavily on an extensive expan-
sion of powered low emission vehicles (see for instance Refs.
[20,27,79,10,21]. In Britain, hopes for development of ultra-low
emission vehicles intended to replace the current ﬂeet of vehicles,
is the dominant feature of the Westminster Government’s plan for
meeting its commitments to reduce carbon from transport. This
ambition is illustrated in Government’s Carbon Plan [40] (Fig. 1).
Low emission vehicles are not the sole strand of measures
to improve pollution from transport. Other measures, appearing
in transport policy and planning locally, nationally and interna-
tionally, and intended to help reduce transport pollution include
various approaches intended to increase walking and cycling, to
support public transport and to reduce travel (e.g. Refs. [2,16,27]).
However these take a secondary role at present. For instance, the
Committee on Climate Change (who advise the English Govern-
ment) hopes that measures to encourage travel by means other
than private cars could yield reduction of 3 MtCO2 by the early
2020s ([10], p. 142). This is small compared to the approximate 43
MtCO2 reduction from road transport intended by the CCC in the
same period.2
This policy approach has implications on two levels for our ﬁrst
contention on mobility justice. First, some of the speciﬁc policies
in this area raise concerns about fairness and distributive justice.
Second, the overarching approach of focusing on vehicle technol-
ogy may  exacerbate existing justice concerns around accessibility,
affordability and availability of transport. These are explored in the
remainder of this section.
3.1. Distributive fairness and pollution policies
We brieﬂy describe two  pollution reduction policies which
exemplify the kinds of initiatives which are underway to tackle
a combination of local and global environmental issues. The ﬁrst is
the raft of incentives which are currently in place to encourage the
adoption of electric vehicles. There is a substantial cost premium
between a new electric vehicle and a new petrol or diesel engine
vehicle. This is, in part due to the technology maturing, but also
because of continued high battery prices. Over time it is anticipated
that this cost differential will reduce (see Ref. [10]). The extent of
the cost differential between the vehicles which the consumer is
faced with is a matter of government policy. In the UK, for exam-
ple, a £5000 grant is available for electric vehicles which makes,
for example, an electric VW Golf around one third more expen-
sive to buy than a petrol equivalent. There are then in-use charges
which can also be manipulated with, for example, electric vehi-
cles paying lower energy taxes, being exempt from annual road
charges and the like [10]. The running costs of the electric Golf in
the UK are estimated to be around one third of those of the petrol
equivalent. The country with the highest proportion of new electric
vehicle sales (23% of all new vehicle sales in June 2015) is Norway.
Table 1 shows the incentives on offer in Norway until 2018 and the
questions which this might raise.
In this respect we  could expect advantages to people who  have
access to an electric vehicle, and who therefore use less of their
income engaging in whatever activities involve driving. That by
itself might not concern justice, if those who do not beneﬁt do
not also suffer a further dis-beneﬁt. However there could also be
further reaching more indirect impacts. For instance, costs of run-
2 43MtCO2 is calculated using the CCC Headline Indicators for the British third
carbon budget which runs to 2022 (CC2015, Annex 4) and from other data in the
CCC [10] report.
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Fig. 1. Source [40], p. 53.
Table 1
Norweigan Electric Vehicle Incentives [89].
Incentive Issue
Exempt from purchase tax (currently around 100% of the cost of the vehicle) There are other ways in which this tax rebate could have
been spent
Exempt from VAT on purchase at 25% of transaction Essential items such as clothes (25%) food (15%) have VAT
payable as does public transport (8%)
Exempt from annual road tax (£230/annum)
Exempt from all public parking fees These all make use, rather than ownership of the car more
advantageous relative to other modes.Exempt from all toll payments
Rights to use the bus lanes
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Inaccessibility and lack of availability or difﬁcultly in paying for
travel, in their many often quite diverse forms, can be justice prob-
lems as they can be a ﬁrm barrier to participation in social andAccess to a public charging network of 5000 public charging stations 
ing second hand cars may  increase due to battery maintenance,
r there may  be pressure to raise fuel duty for fossil fuel vehicles,
articularly as they become a minority yet one which is predomi-
antly low income drivers. These are a potential consideration for
ustice, albeit a consideration complicated by the problem that the
ature and scale of such impacts are difﬁcult to judge, especially in
dvance of the ability to make assessments the scale of any changes
n disposable income.
In London, in addition to a less aggressive role out of electric
ehicles, an Ultra-Low Emissions Zone has been proposed. The zone
hich will operate 24/7, partly for practical reasons will cover the
ame area as the central area congestion charge and will be enacted
n 2020. The approach has been to develop different standards
hich should be adopted by different user categories (e.g. car, bus,
axi, motorcycle) with the aim that most vehicles entering the zone
ill be compliant as a result of ﬂeet renewal. It is estimated that 23%
f heavy goods vehicles, 27% of cars and 33% of light goods vehicles
sing the zone will pay the charge [90]. The fee for drivers is set
o be £12.50 per day. The goal is therefore to deter frequent users
ho are also high emitters of NOx and particulates and to provide
patially targeted improvements to air quality, which is currently
bove levels deﬁned as safe to human health. This is a an access and
se based charge rather than an ownership charge and therefore
nly mirrors part of the issues raised by electric vehicle subsidy.
ere the concern will be that these are regressive taxes, especially
f it is those who are wealthier who can afford the less polluting
ehicles [26,97]. Exemptions are perhaps an obvious response toThese spaces are often in convenient and prestigious
locations and commit road space to car use.
justice concerns associated with regressive taxes, or more broadly
with high costs of travel. However it is only if we can determine
that this justice problem is marginal, affecting only a small number
of people and their vehicles and so requiring just a few exemptions,
that exemptions would mitigate the concern without counteract-
ing the very purpose of the tax or charge on polluting vehicles.3
Discussions surrounding exemptions and discounts to the London
congestion charge were contentious, with discounts or exemptions
for people with disabilities, National Health Service vehicles, and
armed services, residents living in certain areas near the congestion
charge zone, low emission vehicles, motorcycles, public Transport,
and emergency services.4 What are the implicit values being placed
on different activities here and would they apply also to pollution
charges?
3.2. Accessibility, transport availability and policy on low
emission vehicles3 Here we have left open the question of how the justice problem might be deter-
mined, that is, what level of ﬁnancial burden, affecting which people, would be a
justice problem requiring action.
4 See TfL [91] https://tﬂ.gov.uk/modes/driving/congestion-charge/discounts-
and-exemptions.
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ersonal activities, caring, education, employment, healthcare, and
o on. To see this, let us reﬂect on existing arrangements of transport
nd mobility. For many people, many everyday activities involve
ravel by car (or similar) either as driver or passenger: for instance
n Britain, estimates are that 64% of trips were by car in 2014 [19],
nd across Europe in 2013 over 83% of passenger km were by car
31]. It is not just that more of this travel happens to involve cars, but
ather it seems that in many cases there is little other option, and
ravel without a car can be difﬁcult for a range of reasons, including:
i. Time taken to access services can be much greater without a
car (see for instance, Ref. [17], s1.5). The relevance to justice of
this form of accessibility is complicated by the way in which
the importance of access to given services varies for different
people, and at different times. Further justice concerns may  arise
if an accessible service is not the most appropriate of its type for
the people requiring it (this might be especially relevant where
services specialise—for instance, specialist hospitals).
i. There are physical difﬁculties in travelling without a car, includ-
ing:
Difﬁculties in negotiating public transport [86];
Severance caused by busy roads [68];
Relatively high risks and safety fears associated with some non-
car modes [68,59]
Insufﬁcient public transport and lift services (see Ref. [98]);
i. Walking in polluted and unpleasant environments (such as
igh trafﬁc environments) has been found to be detrimental to
elfare [7].
Finally there are concerns that unaffordability of transport has
etrimental impacts on household budgets. Public transport fares
ave been identiﬁed as a factor exacerbating social inequalities
86]. Further where access by non-car means is particularly poor
e.g. in rural areas), signiﬁcant proportions of household budgets
an be spent on running a car, leaving less wealthy people facing
hat Mattioli and Colleoni (2015) call ‘car related economic stress’.
While trafﬁc makes participation difﬁcult for some, it does not
ecessarily make it impossible. So drawing on the sort of libertarian
rgument that says people should manage for themselves even if
hat is difﬁcult, some might question whether this difﬁculty in par-
icipating is really a concern of justice. Yet this form of argument
s problematic for any idea of distributive justice which is broadly
oncerned with the welfare that people are able to achieve. Simply,
aking basic or important activities difﬁcult, even if not entirely
mpossible, is going to inhibit that welfare. What we  have is a mobil-
ty system which privileges those who can access a private vehicle
nd can afford to use it, and which privileges certain activities over
ccess to welfare for others. Consequently it is not feasible to dis-
iss the relevance to justice of problems of travelling without a
ar.
Given this, what are the further justice implications of pollution
olicy emphasising take up of low emission vehicles? There is some
ifﬁculty in assessing what impact this policy approach might have
n the difﬁculty of moving around without a car. This is due to
he problems of speculating with conﬁdence on whether electric
ehicle uptake would be on the basis of one-to-one replacement
or journeys, by conventional vehicles. It is suggested that there is
ome demand elasticity between car travel and fuel prices ([15], p.
58). Beyond this, wider social changes, which might or might not
e inﬂuenced by availability of electric vehicles, might have impacts
n the way in which vehicles are used in future [37]. Moreover it
s not apparent just how much, or how fast electric vehicles might
e taken up. For instance, the UK government grant intended to
ncentivise sales of ultra-low emission vehicles will be reviewed
fter ‘50,000 cars have been sold’ ([16], p. 8). Even at this level, Social Science 18 (2016) 109–117 113
50,000 private low emission vehicles appear a drop in the ocean
given over 26 million private cars on Britain in 2013 [18]. There is
uncertainty about how much, or where, impacts of low emission
vehicles would be felt there were much higher levels of take up.
Yet these questions about future impacts of policy on electric
vehicles, risk obscuring an important factor. That is, we  have a
policy approach predicated on the assumption that there will be
a major take up of low emission vehicles, and so gives relatively
little attention to reducing travel by powered vehicles. As such, it
is a policy approach which seems to help sustain our existing con-
ditions involving reliance on cars. Consequently it is an approach
which fails to address the mobility injustices which as we discussed
in the last section are associated with difﬁculties in moving around
without access to a car.
4. Reconciliation for mobility justice?
The second contention we set out in Section 1 is that recon-
ciling multiple aspects of mobility justice prompts a reassessment
of theories of justice or fairness implicit in many of these norma-
tive debates. This might not be immediately apparent: much of
the tension described above is associated with unequal wealth and
cost burdens, and a ﬁrst attempt at resolution might be to reach
for familiar forms of re-distribution. In this section we ﬁrst con-
sider the potential, and the limitation for justice of a re-distributive
approach. We  then examine the alternative approach of reconcil-
ing the tension by a mobility system substantially more focused on
walking, cycling, and public transport and with much less emphasis
on private vehicles. This, we  argue, could tackle limitations of re-
distribution, and it is this that requires reﬂection on the underlying
normative theories.
4.1. Cost and choice
Altering resource distribution might take multiple forms, rang-
ing from a comprehensive public policy programme for reducing
wealth inequalities to far more focused measures within speciﬁc
sectors or areas. It could, initially, appear that attempting to tackle
mobility justice through resource re-distribution might require
only focused interventions, for instance around reducing tax, or
providing subsidies for low emission vehicles and fuel. This idea
has some traction in policy and public debate where arguments on
fuel taxes are often framed in terms of their distributional impacts
[36,44,97]. Tax and subsidy may  impose greater or fewer burdens
on different groups, and can be more or less just. However this is a
long way  from its being a tool for effectively tackling mobility jus-
tice. To begin, a necessary condition would be that the system was
robust enough to provide people with low emission vehicles which
they could afford to run. There are, at best, doubts over the ﬁnan-
cial viability of this sort of intervention (cf. [33]) and potentially
further questions on whether production of low emission vehicles
could meet the levels required. Moreover, to avoid creating greater,
acute, mobility injustices, any policy approach of this sort would
need to facilitate provision for people who cannot drive. Shared
vehicles, lift services might provide for some of his need, although
extensive provision might raise further questions about affordabil-
ity and employment conditions for those stafﬁng the services (cf.
[74]).
The sorts of (re-)distribution discussed here are difﬁcult and per-
haps unfeasible for public policy. If however we put these doubts
aside, a further concern appears. The proposal here is to support
much greater use of vehicles, and that will limit other possibilities,
including possibilities for land use taken up by roads and parking
spaces, and options of moving around without vehicles. This con-
straint could be framed as a limiting of people’s choices. Against
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his, there might be an attempt to draw on preference utilitarian
rguments to claim that the constraints are a legitimate conse-
uence of people exercising their choice to use vehicles. This type
f claim tends to be subject to objections that inequalities in society
ean that people have greatly unequal ability to exercise choice,
nd that therefore they frequently face unjust conditions imposed
y the consequences of other people’s choices (see Ref. [25]). How-
ver if there were the sort of redistribution described here, which
eeks to reduce inequalities in access to vehicles, then this claim
ould have some resilience to such objections. Nevertheless the
esilience would not save the argument. The possibilities avail-
ble to people, and the decisions people take to travel in particular
ays to particular places, are all made and constrained, within the
ontext of the built environment within which they live. People
nﬂuence those conditions, but individually they cannot be said to
ave created or chosen them (see Refs. [51,78]). So the question
hat remains is, what possibilities (or sets of choices) do we  collec-
ively want to attempt to facilitate? We  will return to this question
ater in this section.
.2. Values in less motorised mobility
There is nothing new in the idea that mobility involving substan-
ially more walking, cycling, public Transport, taxis and lift sharing,
long perhaps with travel reductions (perhaps using more virtual
echnology) can reduce transport pollution (see Ref. [51]). Impor-
antly for our present discussion, these forms of mobility have often
een presented as having potential to address many of the justice
oncerns associated with accessibility, availability and affordabil-
ty of transport (e.g. Refs. [41,46,59]). This idea also follows from
iscussion in Section 3 which described how trafﬁc itself can be a
obility barrier especially for those reliant on non-car modes, and
 ﬁnancial burden for some people who rely on car use.
Yet there are also questions about whether, or under what
onditions, greater non-car mobility could reconcile the different
spects of mobility justice. First is a need to consider potential
mplications of a signiﬁcant shift to reducing car use. In part this
s required because, although there has been long-lived discussion
f the beneﬁts of reducing travel by cars, this has not translated
nto substantial levels of change. There are partial exceptions, such
s quite dramatic increases in levels of cycling in some countries
such as Netherlands, German and Denmark—see Ref. [70], but in
hose cases the change has not been great enough to avoid sub-
tantial pollution problems (compare NOx emissions in Denmark
28]; Netherlands [29]; UK [30], and greenhouse gas emissions from
ransport [92–94]). So what might be the other justice implications
f changes substantial enough to effectively reduce the injustices
ollution creates?
We  can expect that a signiﬁcant shift to non-car mobility would
imit possibilities for, or ease of, conducting some activities, while
aking other activities easier or more feasible. There is uncertainty
bout exactly what impacts would be associated with different
onﬁgurations of mobility, coupled with uncertainty about how
ifferent conﬁgurations of mobility could be created (cf. [71,83]).
evertheless we may  be able to make some broad points about the
orts of impacts that might be at issue.
In a move to system of mobility with signiﬁcantly less car use,
mpacts on activities could be expected to depend in part on where
eople live [54], and on how services and developments themselves
e-conﬁgure to take account of the changing mobility system (see
.g. Ref. [73]). Impacts could also vary with differences in physical
ealth and mobility (although any mobility system which does not
itigate these differences would be unjust for that reason alone).
he impacts, and distribution of impacts, may  also stem from dif-
erences in the sorts of activities people engage in, and beneﬁt from.
or instance, some longer distance, or complex leisure travel might Social Science 18 (2016) 109–117
be less feasible where there is more non-car mobility. Some busi-
ness practices might need to Change, especially where a premium
is put on face to face meetings and conferences between geograph-
ically dispersed colleagues (see for instance, Ref. [87]).
We suggest in what follows, that we might not be able to rely on
initial or expert judgements about the importance of activities and
deliberation is required to judge their value and how society might
support them. Nevertheless these initial judgements can be a good
place to start, as questions involved in thinking about value begin to
emerge when we  consider activities for which, on the face of it, we
can expect a broad level of agreement that there is signiﬁcant value.
If justice is concerned that people can obtain a reasonable quality
of life, we  might assume that there is a fairly uncontroversial value
in activities including securing food and shelter, healthcare and
education. Yet once we  begin to think about what these activities
can involve, then it becomes apparent that there is an open ended
range which could reasonably fall within the scope of these basic
activities. As Shove [82] argues, everyday practices concerned with
apparently basic aspects of living, alter and over time can expand
to involve increasing resources. Among the inﬂuences on practices
are the conditions in which they occur and which make them possi-
ble. For instance, for many people, aspects of health, and sometimes
life-saving healthcare, can be supported by fast access to hospitals
and access to medicine, by constant availability of nutritious food,
by good housing and by living in unpolluted areas. Some of these
activities, such as access to specialist healthcare, are supported by
a transport system which accommodates relatively long distance
travel by geographically dispersed populations. This is not just a
question of getting ambulances in emergencies, but takes in fac-
tors such as health service logistics, patient appointments, staff
and visitor travel. It may, for example, be necessary to consider
changing the spatial patterns of health service delivery in a mobil-
ity system far less reliant on cars (cf. [45]). Whilst this might seem
challenging it is worth reﬂecting that some cities are already far less
car dependent and we  already have different service structures in
play. However these justice questions require deliberation of sub-
stantive values: for instance, we  may  need to consider the value of
a mobility system capable of supporting very specialist healthcare
interventions against value of a less polluted environment or an
environment which presents fewer barriers associated with trafﬁc.
This is where attempts to reconcile different aspects of mobil-
ity justice lead us to diverge from some liberal theories of justice
which aim to develop sets of resources and conditions to which
people should have access. In short, we  are arguing that we  need
to think about substantive values of activities which involve differ-
ent resources or conditions. Moreover we are suggesting that there
can be constraints on how people can justiﬁably engage in activi-
ties which contribute to quite fundamental needs. The reason for
this is just the equal importance of others’ ability to participate,
and the potential for some forms of participation to amount to bar-
riers to other activities. This might appear controversial, however
as we noted in earlier sections, this is an approach which reﬂects a
long tradition in political philosophy of virtue ethics and commu-
nitarianism which places emphasis on consideration what should
be valued, and supported by society. Further, substantive values
already shape much public policy, such as healthcare provided by
taxpayers and free at the point of need.
In thinking about how to make these substantive value judge-
ments about different types of activities, it is possible to take some
steer from the basic ideas of equality unpinning many theories of
justice. Yet these take us only so far. These ideas can be good at
helping to identify some injustices, but although they do give a
guide, they leave more difﬁcult questions for thinking about what
is just. As we can see with the example of specialised health-
care services many justice questions are nuanced, and there are
no obvious judgements about what is just. Following others, we
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an suggest that in a democratic society these types of questions
hould form part of public deliberation and debate (for instance,
efs. [23,58,64,84]).5
.3. Partial knowledge, reﬂexivity, and understanding impacts of
hange
Questions about what activities should be supported and what
onditions are just, cannot be separated from questions of how we
ssess the inﬂuence of different mobility conﬁgurations on activi-
ies, and how different conﬁgurations might occur. Without some
bility to understand what activities are feasible, there is little pur-
ose in attempting to discuss substantive values of those activities.
urther, if we are uncertain about the inﬂuence of interventions
whether these come from policy, or citizens’ or organisations’
ctions), then we may  also run a risk that interventions will lead
o circumstances more unjust than before. To aid decision-making
here are, of course, models and other decision-support tools draw-
ng on combinations of theories of behaviour (such as welfare
conomics, behavioural economics, social psychology) and empiri-
al data (see e.g. Ref. [62]). It is worth recognising the limitations of
hese tools. So, it may  be inevitable that models are theory laden6
nd that debate on theories will be an ongoing process, involving
ifﬁcult questions about how well social scientiﬁc theories explain
hat has happened and predict what will happen [71]). It may
lso be inevitable that data is partial. Data collection is limited by
racticalities, and will be shaped by the theories and assumptions
nderpinning the models (see Ref. [52]).
Reﬂexive approaches in social and other sciences, and in gov-
rnance, have been proposed in response to recognition that
nowledge and predictions are something that is at best par-
ial and uncertain [5,13,76]. Given this, reﬂexive approaches may
ave something to offer in thinking about implications of differ-
nt mobility conﬁgurations. Very broadly, reﬂexive approaches
ccept that people’s understandings will be shaped by the (parts
f the) world they live in, and so in that sense will be partial.7
hese approaches also suggest that activities do not follow con-
tant patterns over time but instead develop and Change, partly, in
esponse to one another [83]. By recognising partial knowledge and
npredictability, reﬂexive approaches hold prospects of building
rocesses of knowledge development which include involvement
f people across society. These approaches can take seriously the
rospects that knowledge is distributed across groups and people in
ociety (e.g. Ref. [6]). Further, these approaches may  avoid attempt-
ng to fully specify aims or ambition for change at a single point in
ime, instead leaving some ﬂexibility to take account of develop-
ents and to make provisional decisions based on recognition that
nowledge at a given point is only partial. This is intended to give
cope for developing knowledge, and interventions, in response to
he different (partial) knowledge brought by different people and
n response to emerging events [76].
The difﬁculties and potential limitations faced by participatory
pproaches should not be understated however. To be meaningful,
articipatory approaches would involve deliberation, inﬂuencing
ublic policy and planning, from national, regional or even inter-
ational levels (concerning high level positions, such as on the sort
f public services society might support and the transport system
5 It should be noted that this is not an argument for ethical relativism: we are
aying that non-relativist notions of justice imply that we  need to make the collective
udgements about the value of different activities.
6 Attempts by philosophers of science to describe small parts of the world in
erms solely of observable phenomena showed the almost overwhelming difﬁculty
f working without theory—see Refs. [34,88].
7 As we  note in Section 2, this view of knowledge is adopted by communitarians
nd virtue ethicists. Social Science 18 (2016) 109–117 115
required to make them possible) to much more local decisions such
as whether children’s ability to play outside should take priority
over convenience for drivers. There are well documented practical
limits to participation which have implications for the democratic
and epistemic claims which can be made for it. These limits include
tensions between depth of inclusion and the numbers of people
that can engage in public debate. It is difﬁcult to hold nuanced dis-
cussions among large groups (cf. [23,58]), and this limits the both
potential for representation and for including diverse experiences
and knowledge. Further concerns surround power imbalances lead-
ing to certain sorts of knowledge being ignored, and other sorts of
knowledge being privileged (see e.g. Refs. [50,63]). Beyond this are
the many epistemological questions and arguments on the way in
which we can, through any processes, understand aspects of the
world as it is now or in the future.
Despite limitations, reﬂexive approaches appear to have a par-
ticular relevance at least as one of the means for trying to assess
impacts, and justice implications of mobility change. It is clear from
the two policies which we  discussed that the current approach to
thinking through policy implementation is largely blind to a sig-
niﬁcant number of signiﬁcant justice issues. We  suggest this is
likely to be endemic in the sector and connected to the techno-
cratic expert led approach to problem solving. Whether a reﬂexive
approach could produce the epistemic conditions to facilitate dif-
ferent and more just outcomes is a question for further empirical
investigation.
5. Conclusion
The policy imperative for low carbon futures or tackling the
unexpectedly stubborn urban air quality problems in cities across
Europe has led to policy prescriptions which focus on a low car-
bon technology transition. Taken in isolation and focussing on the
achievement of the prescribed goals, the policy prescriptions (if
achievable) promise to tackle spatial environmental injustices and
to contribute to reducing the inter-generational injustices which
climate change in particular implies. We have shown however in
this paper that examining justice from an issue speciﬁc perspec-
tive is to marginalise the wider impacts of policies on notions of
justice more generally. Speciﬁcally, the choices being made at the
start of this transition reinforce the unwillingness of solution sets
to challenge automobility for the most well off and exemplify a
wider problem that the current framing of policy problems and
solutions seems to present for more just interpretations of policy.
Still worse, the policy options pursued to kick start the transition
not only exemplify why  injustice is perpetuated but amplify this
injustice through the allocation of ﬁnancial resources and space to
the most well off in society. Unless we  take a more comprehensive
understanding of mobility justice there is a risk that in attempting
to address one problem, injustice is inadvertently (or deliberately)
widened.
We suggest a move to more reﬂexive governance could provide
a means to navigate through this complex policy period to ensure
that the future imaginings of society and the policies designed to
support that narrow, rather than widen, injustice. Unless thought
is given to the ways in which resources are used and conditions
created, then de facto privileging of activities (and some people’s
choices) leading to stark inequalities is likely to occur. We  do not
underestimate the challenges of furthering such an approach from
both a practical (limited governmental resource) and political (lim-
ited interest in reframing the choice based narrative). It might
indeed be difﬁcult to create effective deliberative processes. How-
ever, the alternative is to accept a range of signiﬁcant yet implicit
policy outcomes which, were they to be open to reasoned debate
would be deemed unpalatable, we hypothesise, by many.
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